Broke autocrats, broken elections: trade shocks and electoral fraud in autocracies

We argue that when terms‐of‐trade (ToT) shocks reduce resource rents, autocrats lose the fiscal capacity to sustain loyalty through patronage and increasingly rely on electoral manipulation as a survival strategy. We present a simple model in which rents finance patronage in normal times, while adverse shocks reduce the effectiveness of loyalty‐buying and induce substitution toward electoral manipulation. We test these implications using a panel of 114 autocracies from 1980 to 2021. Shocks are defined as ToT declines larger than 10%, and their impact is estimated on V‐Dem's Clean Elections Index using a difference‐in‐differences design with country and year fixed effects. Results show that negative trade shocks are associated with worse electoral conditions, especially in resource‐rich regimes, consistent with a shift from patronage to manipulation. These findings highlight how volatility in global markets can shape electoral strategies and authoritarian control.