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From doubt to devotion: trials and learning-based pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Gan, Tan
  • Wu, Nicholas

Abstract

An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has private information about product match, which affects the buyer’s private consumption experience. The belief gap between both parties coupled with the buyer’s learning yields mechanisms providing the skeptical buyer with limited access to the product and an option to upgrade if the buyer is swayed by a good experience. Depending on the seller’s screening technology, this takes the form of free/discounted trials or dynamic tiered pricing, which are prevalent in digital markets. Unlike static environments, having consumer data can reduce sellers’ revenue in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Gan, Tan & Wu, Nicholas, 2026. "From doubt to devotion: trials and learning-based pricing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 130260, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:130260
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    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/130260/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. N. U. Ahmed & Shian Wang, 2021. "Optimal Control of Dynamic Systems Driven by Vector Measures," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-82139-5, March.
    2. Anastasios Dosis, 2022. "On the informed principal model with common values," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 792-825, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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