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Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values

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  • Govindan, Srihari
  • Wilson, Robert

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and is not affected by the rule for resolving tied bids.

Suggested Citation

  • Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2010. "Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values," Research Papers 2056, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2056
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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2056.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2010. "Existence of Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions," Research Papers 2058, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Dutra, Renato Cabral Dias & Carpio, Lucio Guido Tapia, 2021. "Biodiesel auctions in Brazil: Symmetry of bids and informational paradigm," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    3. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2010. "Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetric Bidders," Research Papers 2057, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

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