Sustaining Collusion With Asymmetric Costs
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- Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2011. "Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(1), pages 99-125, January.
- Ciarreta, Aitor & Gutierrez-Hita, Carlos, 2006. "Supply function vs. quantity competition in supergames," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 773-783, July.
- Guigou Jean-Daniel & de Lamirande Patrick, 2015. "Managerial Collusive Behavior under Asymmetric Incentive Schemes," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 333-350, July.
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