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Multidimentionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector PPP Transaction in Latin America

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Estache
  • J.L. Guasch
  • A. Iimi
  • Lourdes Trujillo

Abstract

Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers pursue more than one objective in their PPP transactions. However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award criteria. Using auction data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the probability of renegotiation is estimated by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. It is found that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that such political considerations could hinder efficiency and transparency in auctions. It is also shown that the renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good governance, particularly anticorruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Estache & J.L. Guasch & A. Iimi & Lourdes Trujillo, 2008. "Multidimentionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector PPP Transaction in Latin America," Working Papers ECARES 2008_021, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2008_021
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert W. Rich & Joseph Tracy, 2011. "Early contract renegotiation: An analysis of U.S. labor contracts from 1970 to 1995," Staff Reports 521, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multidimensional auctions; infrastructure development; private sector participation; corruption; governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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