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Information Design and Full Implementation in Nonatomic Games

Author

Listed:
  • Tomala, Tristan

    (HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences)

  • Scarsini, Marco

    (Luiss University Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza)

  • Koessler, Frederic

    (HEC Paris)

Abstract

This paper studies the implementation of Bayes correlated equilibria in symmetric Bayesian games with nonatomic players, using direct information structures and obedient strategies. The main results demonstrate full implementation in a class of games with negative payoff externalities, such as congestion and Cournot games. Specifically, if the game admits a strictly concave potential in every state, then for every Bayes correlated equilibrium outcome with finite support and rational action distributions, there exists a direct information structure that implements this outcome under all equilibria. When the potential is weakly concave, we show that all equilibria implement the same expected total payoff. Additionally, all Bayes correlated equilibria, including those with infinite support or irrational action distributions, are approximately implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomala, Tristan & Scarsini, Marco & Koessler, Frederic, 2026. "Information Design and Full Implementation in Nonatomic Games," HEC Research Papers Series 1625, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:1625
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6313975
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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