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Judgment Aggregation Theory Can Entail New Social Choice Results

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  • Mongin , Philippe

  • Maniquet , Francois

Abstract

Judgment (or logical) aggregation theory is logically more powerful than social choice theory and has been put to use to recover some classic results of this field. Whether it could also enrich it with genuinely new results is still controversial. To support a positive answer, the authors prove a social choice theorem by using the advanced nonbinary form of judgment aggregation theory developed by Dokow and Holzman (2010c). This application involves aggregating classifications (specifically assignments) instead of preferences, and this focus justifies shifting away from the binary framework of standard judgement aggregation theory to a more general one.

Suggested Citation

  • Mongin , Philippe & Maniquet , Francois, 2014. "Judgment Aggregation Theory Can Entail New Social Choice Results," HEC Research Papers Series 1063, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:1063
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    Cited by:

    1. Maniquet, François & Mongin, Philippe, 2016. "A theorem on aggregating classifications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 6-10.
    2. Cailloux, Olivier & Hervouin, Matthieu & Ozkes, Ali I. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2024. "Classification aggregation without unanimity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 6-9.

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    JEL classification:

    • C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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