IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ebg/heccah/0924.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Analytic narrative

Author

Listed:
  • Mongin, Philippe

    ()

Abstract

Since Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast's 1998 collection Analytic Narratives, historians and political scientists have argued about their method, which essentially amounts to constructing case studies in economic and political history by using game theory. The present article describes their contribution before expanding on the methodological problems of "analytic narratives" more broadly.

Suggested Citation

  • Mongin, Philippe, 2009. "Analytic narrative," Les Cahiers de Recherche 924, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0924
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hec.fr/var/fre/storage/original/application/a2d4ca356027cc1ff710b465027693e8.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2003. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 433-462, August.
    2. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
    3. Thierry Foucault & Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel, 2013. "Liquidity Cycles and Make/Take Fees in Electronic Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(1), pages 299-341, February.
    4. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier.
    5. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1770-1795.
    6. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, January.
    7. Wiseman, Thomas, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    8. Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636, November.
      • Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030206, December.
    9. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 541-568.
    10. Israeli, Eitan, 1999. "Sowing Doubt Optimally in Two-Person Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 203-216, August.
    11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
    13. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January.
    14. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
    15. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. Shalev Jonathan, 1994. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 246-259, September.
    17. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
    18. Jean-FranÚois Mertens, 1998. "The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 343-357.
    19. Peski, Marcin, 2008. "Repeated games with incomplete information on one side," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    20. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6103 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Tristan Tomala & J. Hörner & S. Lovo, 2009. "Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs," Post-Print hal-00495690, HAL.
    22. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
    23. Thomas, J. P., 1995. "Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-4, January.
    24. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6538 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Jean-FranÚois Mertens, 1998. "The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 343-357.
    26. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
    27. Daniel Paravisini & Veronica Rappoport & Philipp Schnabl & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2015. "Dissecting the Effect of Credit Supply on Trade: Evidence from Matched Credit-Export Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 333-359.
    28. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, March.
    29. repec:dau:papers:123456789/9834 is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Takahashi, Satoru & Chassang, Sylvain, 2011. "Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    31. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
    32. Jérôme Renault, 2001. "3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 221-245.
    33. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6115 is not listed on IDEAS
    34. Piccione, Michele, 2002. "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 70-83, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jean Cartier-Bresson, 2013. "Le pouvoir du positivisme et ses limites : microéconométrie et macroéconométrie actuelles du développement," Working Papers hal-00847005, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    analytic narrative; game theory and history; rational choice theories;

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • N01 - Economic History - - General - - - Development of the Discipline: Historiographical; Sources and Methods

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0924. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antoine Haldemann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/hecpafr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.