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Planning as an integrative device

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  • Xavier, CASTANER
  • Mikko, KETOKIVI

    (Helsinki University of Technology)

Abstract

Middle managers’ shared understanding of organizational priorities is a key determinant of successful goal implementation. In this paper, we analyze whether involving middle managers in the strategic planning process and communicating the agreed-upon goals to them afterwards reduce the bias of their managerial role and thus increase the convergence on their assessments of operational priorities. In a sample of 164 manufacturing plants from five different countries and three industries, in which we asked three middle managers about the organizational priorities, we find that the managerial position bias is strong and that communication but not involvement reduces it.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier, CASTANER & Mikko, KETOKIVI, 2003. "Planning as an integrative device," Les Cahiers de Recherche 775, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0775
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rouziès, Dominique & Hulland, John & Barclay, Donald W, 2010. "Does marketing and sales integration always pay off? evidence from a social capital perspective," Les Cahiers de Recherche 933, HEC Paris.
    2. Xavier Casta-er, 2013. "Management challenges of cultural heritage organizations," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Cultural Heritage, chapter 10, pages i-i Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Ketokivi, Mikko, 2006. "When Does Co-location of Manufacturing and R&D Matter?," Discussion Papers 1051, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    4. Nordqvist, Mattias & Melin, Leif, 2010. "The promise of the strategy as practice perspective for family business strategy research," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, pages 15-25.
    5. Lucrezia Songini & Paola Vola, 2015. "The Role of Professionalization and Managerialization in Family Business Succession," MANAGEMENT CONTROL, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(1), pages 9-43.
    6. Dirk Clercq & Lianxi Zhou & Aiqi Wu, 2016. "Unpacking the relationship between young ventures’ international learning effort and performance in the context of an emerging economy," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-66, March.
    7. Marko Reimer & Sebastiaan Van Doorn & Mariano L. M. Heyden, 2016. "Managers and management control systems in the strategy process," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 121-127, May.
    8. Weismeier-Sammer, Daniela, 2011. "Entrepreneurial behavior in family firms: A replication study," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, pages 128-138.
    9. Thomas Schaefer & Thomas Guenther, 2016. "Exploring strategic planning outcomes: the influential role of top versus middle management participation," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 205-249, May.
    10. Ferreira, Luciana C. de Mesquita, 2011. "Attention process: A multilevel perspective," Insper Working Papers wpe_261, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    11. Mohamud Jama Ali & Elegwa Mukulu & John M. Kihoro & Joyce D. Nzulwa, 2016. "Moderating Effect of Firm Size on the Relationship between Functional Integration and Firm Performance," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(9), pages 38-57, September.
    12. Eddleston, Kimberly A. & Kellermanns, Franz W., 2007. "Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 545-565, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic planning; integration; organizational priorities; middle-management; role bias; managerial position; involvement; communication; MTMM analysis; manufacturing;

    JEL classification:

    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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