School Choice: Money, Race And Congressional Voting Behavior
This paper discovers that a campaign contribution to a member of the U.S. House of Representatives by the National Education Association (the major teacher's union) in the 2000 election cycle reduces the probability that a Representative will vote for a pro-choice amendment to the "No Child Left Behind Act of 2001." It also discovers that a Representative who represents a district with a large African American population or who is Republican is more likely to vote for vouchers. Finally, it notes that subsequent NEA contributions reward anti-voucher representatives and punish pro-voucher Representatives.
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