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Responsabilité civile et contrôle des activités représentant des risques mal connus

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  • Eric Langlais

Abstract

This note focuses on the design of prevention programmes and the role of tort law regarding the control of risky activities, associated with unknown or imperfectly known risks, such as innovation or (long term) environmental damages. Together with the existence of perception bias on the side of citizens, these risks are specific in that they are not insurable.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Langlais, 2011. "Responsabilité civile et contrôle des activités représentant des risques mal connus," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-11, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hanif D. Sherali, 1984. "A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 390-404, April.
    2. John S. Heywood & Matthew McGinty, 2008. "Leading and Merging: Convex Costs, Stackelberg, and the Merger Paradox," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 879-893, January.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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