IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/dpc/wpaper/1211.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Determinants Of The Vietnamese Economics Competitiveness, A Lesson For Developing Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Van Ha NGUYEN

    () (National Economics University, Vietnam.)

  • Xavier GALIEGUE

    (University of Orleans, France)

Abstract

Vietnam has been very successful for the last two decades, since the adoption of “Doi moi” in 1986. Over the last two decades, an economic growth rate in Vietnam has been one of the highest worldwide (with GDP growing by respectively 8% per year). The increase of the Vietnamese share of world trade is the highest of all major Asian exporters (including China) since the mid-1990s. « Why is Vietnam so competitive with respect to other Asian exporters? » This paper considers Vietnam's competitiveness, its definition and measurement. The major characteristic of East Asian economic development is rapid industrialization. It has been accelerated by export orientation and a specialization pattern that has evolved from simple (ie garment, shoes, toys, etc.) to more sophisticated products. Countries have used their comparative advantage to catch up industrialized economies. According to Okita (1985) the great diversity among the Asian nations in their stages of development and resource endowments “works to facilitate the flying geese pattern of shared development as each is able to take advantage of its distinctiveness to develop with a supportive division of labour.” The “flight of wild geese” image has acquired different meanings over time. It was first used to describe the life cycle of industries (Akamatsu, 1962); it has been successively extended to the evolution of industrial structure, then to the shift of industries from one country to another. According to this latter meaning, as Japan and the other East Asian countries leave industries in which they have no comparative advantage, later industrialized countries are able to move in these industries and join the “flying geese” formation. The textile & clothing industry offers an example of the shift of industries in Asia, from Japan to Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan etc. then to Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand etc. and now to China, Vietnam, etc. In this paper, we also analyze Vietnam's potential for sustainable growth and international integration. Our paper draws on international foreign trade databases and uses traditional indicators of trade specialization and competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Van Ha NGUYEN & Xavier GALIEGUE, 2011. "The Determinants Of The Vietnamese Economics Competitiveness, A Lesson For Developing Countries," Working Papers 12, Development and Policies Research Center (DEPOCEN), Vietnam.
  • Handle: RePEc:dpc:wpaper:1211
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://depocenwp.org/upload/pubs/NguyenThiThucUyen/TheRelationshipbetweenInnovationandProductivityconditionaltoR&DandICTuse.AnempiricalanalysisforfirmsinLuxembourg_DEPOCEN.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Andreoni, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 1-21.
    2. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 989-1018.
    3. Harsanyi, John C., 1995. "A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 91-122.
    4. Claudia Keser & Bodo Vogt, 2000. "Why Do Experimental Subjects Choose an Equilibrium which Is Neither Payoff Nor Risk Dominant?," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-34, CIRANO.
    5. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 739-771.
    6. S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1999. "Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, pages 36-64.
    7. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 739-771.
    8. Schmidt, David & Shupp, Robert & Walker, James M. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2003. "Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 281-299.
    9. Harsanyi John C., 1995. "A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 318-332.
    10. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 6-38.
    11. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 495-515.
    12. Straub, Paul G., 1995. "Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, pages 339-363.
    13. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1255-1277.
    14. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 749-764.
    15. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Rankin, Frederick W, 1997. "On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 576-596, May.
    16. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2006. "A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 669-693.
    17. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 1-37.
    18. Gérard P. Cachon & Colin F. Camerer, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 165-194.
    19. John B. Van Huyck & Raymond C. Battalio & Richard O. Beil, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 885-910.
    20. Keser, Claudia & Vogt, Bodo, 2000. "Why do experimental subjects choose an equilibrium which is neither risk nor payoff dominant," Papers 00-40, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    21. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competitiveness; Exportation; Exchange rate; labour costs; FDI (Foreign Direct Investment); revealed comparative advantage (RCA).;

    JEL classification:

    • L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dpc:wpaper:1211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Doan Quang Hung). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/depocvn.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.