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Kantian–Nashian Interaction and Petty Tax Corruption in Developing Countries

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  • Binh Tran-Nam

    (UNSW Sydney, Australia, and Development and Policies Research Center (DEPOCEN), Vietnam)

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple, theoretical tax collection model to explain the observed level of petty tax corruption in developing countries such as China or Vietnam. Building on the work of Professor Ngo Van Long on Kantian economics, it extends the deterrence model of tax compliance by examining the static interaction between business taxpayers and tax auditors, who are assumed to follow either the Kantian behavioural norm or the Nashian concept of self-interest rationality. The model allows behavioural reversal: a Kantian agent may switch into being a Nashian one if the reward is sufficiently large, and it incorporates tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax compliance costs. The four possible interactions between taxpayers and tax auditors produce a variety of results concerning the conditions for tax corruption to occur, its type (extortionary or collusive), its probability, revenue losses, bribes to tax auditors and taxpayers’ savings. These results appear consistent with stylized facts about tax corruption in developing countries, and the paper draws policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Binh Tran-Nam, 2023. "Kantian–Nashian Interaction and Petty Tax Corruption in Developing Countries," Working Papers 194, Development and Policies Research Center (DEPOCEN), Vietnam.
  • Handle: RePEc:dpc:wpaper:0223
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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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