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Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions

Author

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  • Nejat Anbarci
  • Ching-jen Sun

Abstract

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the .robustness of intermediate agreements. plus additional well-known and plausible axioms, provide novel axiomatizations of the above-mentioned solutions. Hence, we provide a unified frame-work for comparing these solutions’ bargaining theories.

Suggested Citation

  • Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers 2012_7, Deakin University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2012_7
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    File URL: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/workingpapers/papers/2012_7.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash’s bargaining problem; robustness; intermediate agreements; the Discrete Raiffa solution; the Nash solution; Proportional solutions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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