IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate Espionage


  • Pascal Billand
  • Christophe Bravard
  • Subhadip Chakrabarti
  • Sudipta Sarangi


We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Sudipta Sarangi, 2009. "Corporate Espionage," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 854, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp854

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rathmann, M., 2007. "Do support systems for RES-E reduce EU-ETS-driven electricity prices?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 342-349, January.
    2. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2008. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 237-266, March.
    3. Denny, Eleanor & O'Malley, Mark, 2009. "The impact of carbon prices on generation-cycling costs," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1204-1212, April.
    4. Bode, Sven & Groscurth, Helmuth-Michael, 2006. "Zur Wirkung des EEG auf den "Strompreis"," HWWA Discussion Papers 348, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    5. Weigt, Hannes & Hirschhausen, Christian von, 2008. "Price formation and market power in the German wholesale electricity market in 2006," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 4227-4234, November.
    6. Tuohy, Aidan & Meibom, Peter & Denny, Eleanor & O'Malley, Mark, 2009. "Unit commitment for systems with significant wind penetration," MPRA Paper 34849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    8. repec:spr:compst:v:66:y:2007:i:1:p:21-32 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Ludwig Kuntz & Felix Müsgens, 2007. "Modelling start-up costs of multiple technologies in electricity markets," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 66(1), pages 21-32, August.
    10. Oswald, James & Raine, Mike & Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin, 2008. "Will British weather provide reliable electricity?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 3202-3215, August.
    11. Sensfuß, Frank & Ragwitz, Mario & Genoese, Massimo, 2008. "The merit-order effect: A detailed analysis of the price effect of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 3076-3084, August.
    12. Thure Traber & Claudia Kemfert, 2009. "Impacts of the German Support for Renewable Energy on Electricity Prices, Emissions, and Firms," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 155-178.
    13. Lise, Wietze & Linderhof, Vincent & Kuik, Onno & Kemfert, Claudia & Ostling, Robert & Heinzow, Thomas, 2006. "A game theoretic model of the Northwestern European electricity market--market power and the environment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(15), pages 2123-2136, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2010. "Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies," MPRA Paper 28188, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item


    Oligopoly; multimarket; networks;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp854. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.