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Economie politique de la croissance au Burkina Faso: Institutions, gouvernance et développement

Listed author(s):
  • Estelle Koussoubé

    ()

    (PSL, Université Paris Dauphine, LEDa, IRD, UMR DIAL)

  • Augustin Loada

    ()

    (University of Ouagadougou)

  • Gustave Nebié

    ()

    (UNICEF, Dakar)

  • Marc Raffinot

    ()

    (PSL, Université Paris Dauphine, LEDa, IRD, UMR DIAL)

(english) This paper assesses the relevance of the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) framework to explain the performances of Burkina in terms of economic growth and development. The political history of Burkina has been very unstable until president Compaoré took power in 1987. Since then, stability has been based on low intensity violence, with bursts of open violence like those of the mutinies of 2011 or the final upheaval of 2014. This “stability” is based on the balance of power between two main “elite” groups, the Army and the traditional chiefs. Trade unions, the Catholic Church and donors also play a role, especially in case of trouble. The political class in power and its cronies are extracting rents by creating de facto monopolies, which enables them to tame violence, to a certain extent. The paradox is that the Burkinabe economy is growing steadily (GDP per capital grew at an average 1.5 per cent rate since independence), rather smoothly in the medium run – one of the best records in West-Africa. Because of high inequality, this impressive growth is far from inclusive. _________________________________ (français) L’approche de North, Wallis et Weingast (2009) est utilisée pour expliquer les performances économiques et sociales du Burkina Faso (croissance par tête de 1,5 % par an depuis 1960, inégalement répartie, sans transformation structurelle du système productif). La difficulté est que la croissance est assez faible, mais plus rapide que dans les pays voisins. Nous montrons que ces deux aspects peuvent s’expliquer par le type d’élites dominantes (l’armée et les chefs traditionnels), qui gèrent la violence par la création de rentes dans un contexte contraint par les autres élites internes (église catholique, syndicats et société civile) et par le cadre institutionnel international qui limite l’utilisation de la violence. Ceci confère une certaine « stabilité » à l’ordre social sans toutefois lui insuffler la dynamique qui lui permettrait d’atteindre une croissance rapide.

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File URL: http://www.dial.ird.fr/media/ird-sites-d-unites-de-recherche/dial/documents/publications/doc_travail/2015/2015-10
File Function: First version, 2015
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Paper provided by DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation) in its series Working Papers with number DT/2015/10.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2015
Handle: RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt201510
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