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Capitalist Versus Family Bequest: An Econometric Model with Two Endogenous Regimes


  • Arrondel, L.
  • Laferrere, A.


Wealth is highly concentrated among a few very rich individuals. The usual models of wealth transmission offer life-cycle and family motives for bequests. The hypothesis here is that those motives are not likely to be active for very rich individuals. Using a sample of French estate records over-weighted in very rich individuals, we show, by estimating a model with two endogenous alternative regimes, that the variables influencing the bequests of the less rich are not active for the very wealthy.

Suggested Citation

  • Arrondel, L. & Laferrere, A., 1996. "Capitalist Versus Family Bequest: An Econometric Model with Two Endogenous Regimes," DELTA Working Papers 96-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  • Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:96-06

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. André Masson & Daniel Verger, 1996. "Présentation générale," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 296(1), pages 3-11.

    More about this item



    JEL classification:

    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution


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