Entry Strategies, Welfare Analysis and Firms’ Behaviors
Before serving a new market, a multinational enterprise (MNE) has several entry strategies, which include foreign direct investment (FDI), joint venture (JV) and exclusive licensing (EL). Entry cost, market size of the host country, and the discount rate are the main determinants when the MNE chooses its optimal entry strategy. At a certain level of ownership share that the MNE holds, JV will generate the highest social welfare. If firms can choose between competition and collusion, at different levels of the discount rate under FDI and EL, collusive and cheating behavior will happen.
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