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Limited Liability, Growth and Welfare in a Small Open Economy

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  • Jeremy Ascher

Abstract

This paper examines the time path of consumption and asset ownership in a small open economy. Productive physical capital is borrowed when limited liability firms write debt contracts with foreign lenders. We study three lending regimes and find that when contracts favor domestic agents over foreign lenders, welfare is often higher despite a significant reduction in the level of foreign lending. Consistent with the data, the model predicts a hump-shaped pattern of Net Income Payments Abroad. Lastly, under the regime less attractive to foreign investors, the small open economy exhibits transitional dynamics isomorphic to those of the standard neo-classical closed economy

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Ascher, 2004. "Limited Liability, Growth and Welfare in a Small Open Economy," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_019, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
  • Handle: RePEc:deg:conpap:c009_019
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Growth; International Lending;

    JEL classification:

    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies

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