Delegated agency in multiproduct oligopolies with indivisible goods
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KeywordsMultiproduct Price Competition; Delegated Agency Games; Mixed Bundling Prices; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium; Strong Equilibrium;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-05-02 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-05-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2010-05-02 (Game Theory)
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