Understanding Child Marriage: Theory and Evidence for Boys and Girls

This paper examines how child marriage rates for both boys and girls respond to exogenous shocks to rainfall, temperatures, and conflict. Using individual-level data from India, Indonesia, and Nepal, I empirically estimate the effects of shocks on child marriage. Low rainfall and high temperatures, which reduce income, decrease the annual probability of child marriage for boys and girls by 1-8%. Exposure to conflict, which increases the risk of experiencing conflict-related violence, decreases child marriage for boys and increases it for girls by up to 30% and 3%, respectively. Effects are similar regardless of the child's age, spousal age gap, or direction of the marriage transfer. I also develop a theoretical household bargaining model, which predicts that negative shocks to income or to child marriage preferences reduce child marriage rates. These findings suggest a perverse relationship between income and child marriage, which is relevant for policymakers seeking to simultaneously reduce child marriage and poverty.