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Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques : une analyse économétrique

Author

Listed:
  • Gbewopo Attila

    (Université de Clermont I, CERDI-UMR CNRS)

  • Gérard Chambas

    (Université de Clermont I, CERDI-UMR CNRS)

  • Jean-Louis Combes

    (Université de Clermont I, CERDI-UMR CNRS)

Abstract

L’objet de cet article est d’analyser l’effet de la corruption sur la mobilisation des recettes publiques. Une analyse économétrique sur données de panel (125 pays et couvrant la période 1980-2002) permet de ne pas rejeter l’hypothèse d’un effet négatif de la corruption sur les recettes publiques. Cet effet négatif de la corruption n’affecte pas de manière identique les différentes composantes de recettes. En raison probablement des opportunités différentes de rente, la corruption modifie la structure du prélèvement public au profit des recettes tarifaires assises sur le commerce international et au détriment des impôts directs et indirects, dont en particulier la TVA. Il apparaît également qu’un canal de transmission important de la corruption sur le prélèvement public est celui transitant par un affaiblissement du civisme fiscal capté à travers des variables de l’action publique.

Suggested Citation

  • Gbewopo Attila & Gérard Chambas & Jean-Louis Combes, 2009. "Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques : une analyse économétrique," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2009024, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2009024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2012. "Empirical Survey on the Causes of the Corruption
      [Aperçu empirique sur les causes de la corruption]
      ," MPRA Paper 41484, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; prélèvement public; pays en développement; données de panel;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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