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Legal structure and strategic regulation of intellectual property : Who pays for R&D in arts markets?


  • Andrew E. BURKE

    (University of Edinburgh)


The paper addresses the issue of who pays for the cost of creating artistic works and other forrns of intellectual property. It examines the effect of current legal structure on regulatory performance in markets for intellectual property; specifically the effects of sequential and partial regulation. These entail the regulation of multiple market intellectual property on a "market-by-market" basis (sequential régulation) where the performance in other markets for the same intellectual property is taken as given (partial regulation). The analysis demonstrates that this form of regulation is sub-optimal and creates an incentive for copyright and antitrust, laws to be employed strategically by consumers, firms and regulators. In particular, it creates an incentive to use domestic regulation as an international stratégie device. The theoretical exposition is augmented by an analysis of two regulatory decisions relating to the US market for music performance rights which reflect the stratégie implications of partial and sequential regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew E. BURKE, 2000. "Legal structure and strategic regulation of intellectual property : Who pays for R&D in arts markets?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2000025, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2000025

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    Cited by:

    1. Kranenburg Hans van & Hogenbrink Annelies, 2003. "Determinants of Multimedia, Entertainment, and Business Software Copyright Piracy: A Cross-national Study," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    More about this item


    Strategie regulation; copyright; music performance rights;

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy


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