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Holdups and Non-standard Breach Remedies in Delegation Contracts


  • Christophe DEFEUILLEY

    (cired (ehess and cnrs))


A vast literature is devoted to assess the transactional Approach in several empirical fields. Common to all these studies is the testing of transactional approach conjectures from the standpoint of private contractual relationships. The aim of this paper is to explore the relevance of transaction Cost Theory in the French administrative legal context. The paper examines the delegation contracts used to manage the provision of urban services in France. The paper shows that (1) these delegation contracts can be considered as self enforcing agreements (2) they do not operate in “ the shadow of the law” (3) they feature strong adaptive capabilities. A distinction is made between non-standard contractual arrangements and hybrid governance modes.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe DEFEUILLEY, 1999. "Holdups and Non-standard Breach Remedies in Delegation Contracts," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1999034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:1999034

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    Cited by:

    1. Luc Baumstark & Claude Ménard & William Roy & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2005. "Modes de gestion et efficience des opérateurs dans le secteur des transports urbains de personnes," Post-Print halshs-00103116, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out


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