Holdups and Non-standard Breach Remedies in Delegation Contracts
A vast literature is devoted to assess the transactional Approach in several empirical fields. Common to all these studies is the testing of transactional approach conjectures from the standpoint of private contractual relationships. The aim of this paper is to explore the relevance of transaction Cost Theory in the French administrative legal context. The paper examines the delegation contracts used to manage the provision of urban services in France. The paper shows that (1) these delegation contracts can be considered as self enforcing agreements (2) they do not operate in “ the shadow of the law” (3) they feature strong adaptive capabilities. A distinction is made between non-standard contractual arrangements and hybrid governance modes.
|Date of creation:||03 Sep 1999|
|Date of revision:|
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