Optimal Industrial Policy
The paper derives optimal industrial policy for natural monopoly. It compares the benefit and cost of privatization and regulation taking into account the problems of asymmetric information and of soft budget constraint for regulated firms. It helps to disantangle the notion of 'privatization' and the notion of 'deregulation'. It shows that unless some change occurs in demand or in technology, natural monopolies remain natural monopolies. Whether they should be under public or private ownership depends crucially on the government budget constraint. The optimal policy involves private structure when the opportunity cost of public funds is large.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10473945
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1999004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne DAVISTER-LOGIST)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.