Elected Neighbors and the Supply of Future Politicians

Recent research shows that municipal councilors direct resources and amenities toward the areas surrounding their own residences. This finding underscores the importance of residential diversification within councils, particularly in developing countries where inequalities betweenneighborhoods in the same municipality are especially pronounced. Yet evidence indicates that politicians frequently reside close to one another, which may lead to spatially concentrated representation in municipal councils. This observation raises a key question: what drives the geographicconcentration of politicians? If the election of one resident motivates others from the same neighborhood to run for office, the result may be a council that systematically under-represents other areas. The political process would unintentionally perpetuate, rather than alleviate, spatial inequalities within municipalities. Using precise data on the residences of municipal election candidates in Chile, we estimate the causal effect of electing a candidate on the emergence of future candidacies within a very narrow radius (300 meters) of their home. Applying a regression discontinuity design, we compare neighborhoods where a resident candidate was narrowly elected with those where a resident candidate narrowly lost by a similarly small margin. Our results indicate that the election of a neighbor prompts the emergence of (new) candidacies in the neighborhood. We discuss at least three mechanisms underlying these candidacies. Importantly, our results indicate persistence in the geographic composition of the council, driven primarily by the re-electionof incumbents. This incumbent advantage, however, is conditional on the councilor being pivotal or not aligned with the mayor.