Bycatch ITQ Management in Oligopolistic Fisheries
This paper analyzes the effects of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system implemented on bycatch on the global harvest level of oligopolistic fisheries. We show that the impact of changes in the total allowable catch (TAC) on the equilibrium harvest level depends on the degree of returns to scale in harvest. In particular, a reduction in the TAC may lead to a rise in activity in fisheries characterized by some amount of increasing returns to scale. Besides, these effects appear to be stronger, the fiercer the competition within fisheries.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2011|
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