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Effectiveness of independent boards of Luxembourg funds

Author

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  • Jan Jaap Hazenberg

    (LSF)

Abstract

To protect fund investors against conflicting interests with fund management companies, U.S. mutual funds have mandatory independent directors. That is not the case for funds in Europe, set-up in accordance with the UCITS Directive. Benefitting from the cross-border distribution possibilities of this E.U. legislation, Luxembourg has developed into the second largest fund domicile globally. Although it is not mandatory, many Luxembourg fund boards do have independent members on a voluntary basis. Using a sample of Luxembourg UCITS, this paper finds no consistent evidence that more independent boards have lower costs or achieve better investment performance. However, there are consistent and significant differences between fund management companies that are part of banks or insurers and independent fund management companies. Funds of the latter category have higher costs, but perform better after costs. "Keywords:""Investment funds; European Union; Governance; Board of directors; Fund costs; Fund performance."""

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Jaap Hazenberg, 2012. "Effectiveness of independent boards of Luxembourg funds," LSF Research Working Paper Series 12-11, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:crf:wpaper:12-11
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    File URL: http://wwwen.uni.lu/content/download/53137/634605/file/Effectiveness%20of%20independent%20boards%20of%20Luxembourg%20funds_2012%20(11).pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Jaap Hazenberg, 2012. "Independence and focus of Luxembourg UCITS fund boards," LSF Research Working Paper Series 12-15, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    2. Eric Fricke, 2015. "Board Holdings, Compensation and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 295-312, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    "; "; investment funds; european union; governance; board of directors; fund costs; fund performance."; "; ";
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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