Stochastic and Deterministic Menus in Common Agency games: A corrected version
In this note we argue that in Common Agency games, the restriction to deterministic menus is crutial.We give an simple example (complete information, no moral hazard) in which an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.
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