Relative Performance Evaluation, Risk Aversion and Entry
We study the relations between compensation schemes and risk aversion of managers in a strategic framework. We first show that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts reduces the equilibrium profits of Cournot firms if managers are not too risk averse. Second, we introduce entry issues in our model. We then show that forbidding RPE can favour competition.
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