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Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions


  • Fibich, Gadi
  • Gavious, Arieh
  • Sela, Aner


We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Fibich, Gadi & Gavious, Arieh & Sela, Aner, 2004. "Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4331

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    asymmetric auctions; asymptotic methods; collusion; large auctions; revenue equivalence; risk-averse bidders;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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