The Economic Value of Flexibility When There is Disagreement
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- Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2003. "The Economic Value of Flexibility when there is Disagreement," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-002/2, Tinbergen Institute.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2003.
"Disagreement and Flexibility: A Theory of Optimal Security Issuance and Capital Structure,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
03-001/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan, 2003. "Disagreement and Flexibility: A Theory of Optimal Security Issuance and Capital Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 3708, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mark Pyles & Donald Mullineax, 2008. "Constraints on Loan Sales and the Price of Liquidity," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 33(1), pages 21-36, February.
- Blau, Benjamin M. & Fuller, Kathleen P., 2008. "Flexibility and dividends," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 133-152, April.
More about this item
Keywordscorporate finance; Managerial decision-making;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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