IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/3147.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Reciprocity and the Political Economy of Harmonization and Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Measures

Author

Listed:
  • Suwa Eisenmann, Akiko
  • Verdier, Thierry

Abstract

This Paper discusses the issue of regulatory protectionism and its implication for reciprocity and international bargaining on regulation. In a simple two way trade model a la Brander and Spencer, we take into account the three following features of regulatory measures: a) a regulation raises the cost not only of foreign producers but also of domestic producers; b) a regulation also creates a fixed cost which is entirely supported by foreign exporters; c) a regulation may provide a welfare gain valued per se by individuals or to correct some market failure. In this context, we investigate the political economy forces for unilateral regulatory protectionism and the effectiveness of various intra-sectorial bargaining schemes (negotiated reciprocal regulation setting, harmonization or mutual recognition agreements) to ensure reciprocal market access.

Suggested Citation

  • Suwa Eisenmann, Akiko & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Reciprocity and the Political Economy of Harmonization and Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Measures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3147
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3147
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. A. Mantovani & M. Vancauteren, 2003. "The Harmonization of Technical Barriers to Trade, Innovation and Export Behavior: Theory with an application to EU Environmental Data," Working Papers 480, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    2. Johan F.M. Swinnen & Thijs Vandemoortele, 2008. "The Political Economy of Nutrition and Health Standards in Food Markets," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 460-468.
    3. Johan F.M. Swinnen & Thijs Vandemoortele, 2009. "Trade, Development, and the Political Economy of Public Standards," LICOS Discussion Papers 23609, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    4. MANTOVANI Andrea & VANCAUTEREN Mark, "undated". "The Harmonization of Technical Barriers to Trade, Innovation and Export Behavior: Theory with an Application to EU Environmental Regulations," EcoMod2003 330700094, EcoMod.
    5. Costinot, Arnaud, 2008. "A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 197-213, May.
    6. Toulemonde, Eric, 2013. "A welfare analysis of the principle of mutual recognition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Alberto AMURGO PACHECO, 2006. "Mutual Recognition Agreements and Trade Diversion: Consequences for Developing Nations," IHEID Working Papers 20-2006, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Jun 2007.
    8. Katia Berti & Rod Falvey, "undated". "Does Trade Weaken product Quality Standards?," Discussion Papers 11/24, University of Nottingham, GEP.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mutual recognition; standards; trade policy;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.