Electoral Rules and Public Spending
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Glaeser, Edward L., 2005. "Inequality," Working Paper Series rwp05-056, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Stefano Paternostro & Anand Rajaram & Erwin R. Tiongson, 2007.
"How Does the Composition of Public Spending Matter?,"
Oxford Development Studies,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(1), pages 47-82.
- Paternostro, Stefano & Rajaram, Anand & Tiongson, Erwin R., 2005. "How does the composition of public spending matter?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3555, The World Bank.
- Tomaso Duso, 2002. "On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Edward L. Glaeser, 2005. "Inequality," NBER Working Papers 11511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernardo Bortolotti & Paolo Pinotti, 2003. "The Political Economy of Privatization," Working Papers 2003.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
More about this item
KeywordsElectoral Rules; Proportionality; Public Spending; Transfers;
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2742. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .