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Colonialism, Political Risk, and Firm Performance: Evidence from India

Author

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  • Fenske, James
  • Gupta, Bishnupriya
  • Liu, Junxi

Abstract

Did political risk constrain foreign investment under colonial rule? We compare British and Indian firms in interwar India using novel panel data. Although risk increased for British firms, we find little evidence of capital withdrawal. Financial outcomes differed mainly across industries, while board Indianization and cross-group interlocks increased only gradually and unevenly. British managing agents likewise remained concentrated in familiar sectors, accommodating Indian participation without substantial diversification. Rather than withdrawing uniformly, British firms added Indian directors where local capital, market knowledge, and commercial connections became valuable, while remaining concentrated in industries supported by established expertise and commercial networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Fenske, James & Gupta, Bishnupriya & Liu, Junxi, 2026. "Colonialism, Political Risk, and Firm Performance: Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Papers 22154, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:22154
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    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP22154
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    JEL classification:

    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N65 - Economic History - - Manufacturing and Construction - - - Asia including Middle East
    • N85 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - Asia including Middle East

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