IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/2190.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

To Merge or Not To Merge: That is the Question

Author

Listed:
  • Corchon, Luis
  • Faulí-Oller, Ramon

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about the parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We find that most of the standard tools in dominant strategy implementation, like the revelation principle or the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism can not be applied in our framework. We show that implementation in dominant strategies of the optimal merger policy without budget balance is possible under an additional assumption. The same assumption makes possible the implementation in Nash equilibrium of the optimal merger policy with budget balance.

Suggested Citation

  • Corchon, Luis & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 1999. "To Merge or Not To Merge: That is the Question," CEPR Discussion Papers 2190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2190
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2190
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Cosnita, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2009. "Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 188-196, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers; Welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.