IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/21813.html

Administrative litigation and public procurement outcomes: Evidence from Italy

Author

Listed:
  • Maltese, Enza
  • Rovigatti, Gabriele

Abstract

Administrative review protects legality and contestability in public procurement, but it may also delay public investment, alter the choices of contracting authorities and generate defensive responses by public administrations. This paper studies these effects by linking the universe of Italian procurement procedures to newly released administrative-court records for 2023–2025. Appeals concern only 0.4 percent of procedures but 7.2 percent of tendered value and are concentrated in large, competitive contracts. Using matched duration models, we show that litigated procedures are associated with award times more than 35 percent longer than comparable procedures without appeals and that public works also reach construction-site opening later. Being subject to an appeal has sizeable effects on the subsequent behavior of contracting authorities, as they publish fewer (-30 percent) and smaller (-55 percent on average) public-works tenders and shift away from open procedures toward direct awards. These changes are larger among municipalities with lower administrative capacity. The evidence points to an enforcement-capacity trade-off: administrative review safeguards procurement integrity, but its administrative burden can slow implementation and induce defensive behavior where state capacity is weak.

Suggested Citation

  • Maltese, Enza & Rovigatti, Gabriele, 2026. "Administrative litigation and public procurement outcomes: Evidence from Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 21813, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21813
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP21813
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21813. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CEPR (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://cepr.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.