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Decoupling Taste-Based versus Statistical Discrimination in Elections

Author

Listed:
  • de Albuquerque, Amanda
  • Finan, Frederico
  • Jha, Anubhav
  • Karpuska, Laura
  • Trebbi, Francesco

Abstract

We present a methodology for decoupling taste-based versus statistical discrimination in political behavior. We combine a flexible empirical model of voting, featuring vertical and horizontal candidate differentiation in gender, ability, and policy positions, with a large-scale micro-targeted electoral experiment aimed at increasing female candidate vote shares. Our structural econometric approach allows to separately identify preference parameters driving taste-based discrimination and beliefs parameters driving statistical discrimination through expectations about ability and policy positions of female politicians. Our application to Brazilian municipal elections uncovers substantial levels of taste-based and statistical discrimination. Counterfactual political campaigns show promise in reducing both.

Suggested Citation

  • de Albuquerque, Amanda & Finan, Frederico & Jha, Anubhav & Karpuska, Laura & Trebbi, Francesco, 2025. "Decoupling Taste-Based versus Statistical Discrimination in Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 20291, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20291
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    Cited by:

    1. Aristotelis Epanomeritakis & Davide Viviano, 2025. "Learning What to Learn: Experimental Design when Combining Experimental with Observational Evidence," Papers 2510.23434, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P0 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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