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Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Kamei, Kenju
  • Putterman, Louis
  • Tabero, Katy
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert

Abstract

Corruption is the great disease of government. It undermines the efficiency of the public sector in many countries around the world. We experimentally study civic engagement (CE) as a constraint on corruption when incentives are stacked against providing CE. We show that CE is powerful in curbing corruption when citizens can encourage each other to provide CE through social approval. Social approval induces strategic complementarity among conditional cooperators which counteracts the strategic substitutability (which tends to limit beneficial effects of CE) built into our design. We also show that civic engagement in the lab is correlated with civic engagement in the field, and that the effects of social approval are surprisingly robust to framing in our setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamei, Kenju & Putterman, Louis & Tabero, Katy & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2025. "Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption," CEPR Discussion Papers 19834, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19834
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    2. Kamei, Kenju & Sharma, Smriti & Walker, Matthew J., 2025. "Collective sanction enforcement: New experimental evidence from two societies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
    3. Kirill Afanasev & Tatyana Zhuravleva & Christopher Hannum, 2026. "Extort from Them, but Only if They Comply: Experimental Evidence from Khorog on the Effect of Observed Behavior on Normative Expectations," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 21(1), pages 219-262, January.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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