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Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending

Author

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  • Blickle, Kristian
  • He, Zhiguo
  • Huang, Jing
  • Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia

Abstract

We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an additional advantage through further interactions with the borrower, allowing it to access "specialized" signals. In equilibrium, both lenders use general signals to screen loan applications, and the specialized lender prices the loan based on its specialized signal conditional on making a loan. This private-information-based pricing helps deliver the empirical regularity that loans made by specialized lenders have lower rates (i.e., lower winning bids) and better ex-post performance (i.e., lower non-performing loans). We show the robustness of our equilibrium characterization under a generalized information structure, endogenize the specialized lending through information acquisition, and discuss its various economic implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Blickle, Kristian & He, Zhiguo & Huang, Jing & Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia, 2024. "Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 18938, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18938
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    Keywords

    Credit market competition; Winner's curse; Specialization; Information acquisition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O36 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Open Innovation

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