Mobilité du capital et liquidité internationale en systèmes de change fixe alernatifs
In a two-country world in which the amount of international liquidity is inadequate, we study the effect of the degree of capital mobility on the non-cooperative equilibrium of the game between the monetary authorities of these countries under two kinds of fixed exchange rate systems. One is symmetric and is based upon some external international reserve money; the other is asymmetric because one of the countries issue the international reserve money. We show that the larger the degree of capital mobility is, the less adequate it is to have a symmetric system.
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