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The benefit and cost of winner-picking: redistribution versus incentives

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  • GAUTIER, Axel
  • HEIDER, Florian

Abstract

This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate headquarters´ investment and incentive policies. Winner-picking, i.e., the efficient reallocation of scarce resources in an internal capital market, adds an extra layer of noise to the moral-hazard problem of incentivizing division managers to produce the resources that can then be redistributed. In particular, division managers with strong future investment opportunities anticipate that headquarters will bail them out should they fail to produce enough resources themselves. This reduces incentives to create the resources in the first place, with possible consequences for the optimal investment policy.
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Suggested Citation

  • GAUTIER, Axel & HEIDER, Florian, 2010. "The benefit and cost of winner-picking: redistribution versus incentives," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2198, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2198
    DOI: 10.1628/093245609789919603
    Note: In : Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 165(4), 622-649, 2010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    2. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 2003. "Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1613-1650, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gautier, Axel & Wauthy, Xavier, 2007. "Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 273-295, February.
    2. Axel Gautier & Malika Hamadi, 2005. "Internal Capital Market Efficiency of Belgian Holding Companies," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 26(2), pages 11-34.
    3. Akbel, Basak & Schnitzer, Monika, 2011. "Creditor rights and debt allocation within multinationals," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1367-1379, June.
    4. Almeida, Heitor & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2006. "Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 99-144, January.
    5. Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller & Felix Münnich, 2006. "Financing a Portfolio of Projects," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(4), pages 1289-1325.
    6. Svetlana Grigorieva & Georgii Gorbatov, 2015. "Puzzle of Corporate Diversification Efficiency in Bric Countries," HSE Working papers WP BRP 47/FE/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    7. Löffler, Clemens & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2013. "Centralized versus Decentralized External Financing, Winner Picking and Corporate Socialism," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79902, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

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