IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/2025023.html

Minimum tax, tax haven and the foreign direct investment

Author

Listed:
  • Hindriks, Jean
  • Nishimura, Yukihiro

Abstract

Technological advances and economic globalization have enabled multinational enterprises (MNEs) to avoid taxes by shifting both profits and real investment to low-tax jurisdictions. We develop a tax-competition model in which asymmetric countries compete for profit and investment in the presence of a tax haven. A key feature of the model is that tax haven can only attract profit but not investment. We show that the impact of the Global Minimum Tax (GMT) depends on the form of country asymmetry (unequal tax base or tax capacity), and on the intensity of competition for investment relative to competition for profit. A central result, shared across both types of country asymmetry, is that intensified competition for investment (via market integration or lower country risk), together with stricter profit-shifting regulations, leads the low-tax host country to prefer a higher minimum tax.

Suggested Citation

  • Hindriks, Jean & Nishimura, Yukihiro, 2025. "Minimum tax, tax haven and the foreign direct investment," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2025023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2025023
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dial.uclouvain.be/pr/boreal/en/object/boreal%3A309362/datastream/PDF_01/view
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • F68 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Policy
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2025023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.