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School Choice with Unobservable Matchings

Author

Listed:
  • Mauleon, Ana

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

Abstract

We consider priority-based school choice problems where students can form two types of matches: public matches observed by everyone and private matches generally not observed by others. We introduce the notion of rationalizable conjectural stable (RCS) matching, which generalizes Gale and Shapley (1962)’s stability notion to accommodate private matches. We partially characterize RCS matchings and we show that the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) matching is RCS when private and public matches are perfect substitutes. Finally, we extend the definition of RCS matching to school choice problems when private and public matches are imperfect substitutes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2025. "School Choice with Unobservable Matchings," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2025007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2025007
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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