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Experimental results on the roommate problem

Author

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  • MOLIS, Elena

    (Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, CEREC, B-1000 Bruxelles, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • VESZTEG, Robert F.

    (Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, E-28903 Getafe (Madrid), Spain)

Abstract

We use laboratory experiments to analyze decentralized decision-making in one-sided matching markets. We find that subjects tend to make decisions in line with theoretical models, as their offering and accepting decisions are only guided by the objective of improving upon the status quo. However, isolated individual mistakes, that do not disappear with experience or time, often make theoretically-stable matchings unstable in the laboratory. Markets with incomplete infor- mation are especially prone to this problem.

Suggested Citation

  • MOLIS, Elena & VESZTEG, Robert F., 2010. "Experimental results on the roommate problem," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2010011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2010011
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2010.html
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Agranov, M. & Elliott, M., 2017. "Commitment and (In)Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1743, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Thomas Gall & David Reinstein, 2020. "Losing face," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 164-190.
    3. Fenoaltea, Enrico Maria & Baybusinov, Izat B. & Na, Xu & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2022. "A local interaction dynamic for the matching problem," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 604(C).
    4. Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2020. "Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 212-239, March.
    5. repec:esx:essedp:769 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    convergence; experiments; one-sided matching; stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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