Entry accommodation under multiple commitment strategies: judo economics revisited
We consider a stage-game where the entrant may simultaneously commit to its product's quality and the level of its production capacity before price competition takes place. We show that capacity limitation is more effective than quality reduction as a way to induce entry accommodation: the entrant tends to rely exclusively on capacity limitation in a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is so because capacity limitation drastically changes the nature of price competition by introducing local strategic substitutability whereas quality differentiation only alters the intensity of price competition.
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