Why are some taxes "more equal than others"?
This paper examines efficiency rationales behind uniformity of taxation for public projects. Let a benevolent risk neutral 'constitutional designer' to set an optimal cost-sharing rule for a legislature operating under majority rule. Then the designer will choose 'more equal taxes' for a country with more homogeneous tastes, which is in accord with a popular view. Higher quality projects provide an additional reason for this choice. Moreover, an exogenous requirement to use broader supermajority may also lead to more uniformity.
|Date of creation:||00 Jul 2002|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2002043. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.