Pareto improving social security reform with endogenous growth
It is generally accepted that moving from an unfunded to a funded social security sys- tem implies a welfare loss for the transition generation, that is the generation that has to pay twice: first, saving for its own retirement and second, contributing to the pensions of the then retired generation. This paper shows that in a setting of endogenous growth with positive externality such a transition can be Pareto-improving.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 1996|
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