The Voting Mechanism and Market Allocation : A Note
An example is provided identifying a case of inefficiency arising from the interplay of the voting mechanism and the market mechanism.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 1995|
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- Gabszewicz, J. J. & van Ypersele, T., 1996.
"Social protection and political competition,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 193-208, August.
- GABSZEWICZ, J. J. & van YPERSELE, T., . "Social protection and political competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1230, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, 1994. "Social Protection and Political Competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1994057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
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