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Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts

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  • Juan Manuel Julio Román

    ()

Abstract

A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problemis wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further ine±-ciencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularlythe one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Manuel Julio Román, 2009. "Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 005222, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000094:005222
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    File URL: http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra546.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentives; Agency Theory; Pensions;

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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